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Concerns over the rising power of retailers in the food sector have led many competition authorities to use existing rules or adopt new rules on superior bargaining power, these rules either forming part of competition law statutes or of other functional equivalents.
11 These different rules stay relatively opaque as to the definition of the concept of superior bargaining power, the common characteristic (and presumably) advantage of these provisions being that they may potentially impose competition law related duties to undertakings not disposing of a dominant position or a significant market power, for unilateral conduct, which would have otherwise not been subject to competition law related duties under the traditional rules of abuse of a dominant position. The concept of superior (or unequal) bargaining power is also a well-known concept in the fields of contract law and unfair competition law, 12 where it has given rise to a considerable literature attempting to unveil its theoretical underpinnings. 13 Authors usually contrast the use of this concept in these areas of law, where the focus is on the unfairness of the process of exchange, with the efforts to integrate this rule in the field of competition law, where the emphasis is usually put on outcomes, such as efficiency or consumer welfare.
The underlying objective of contract law or unfair competition statutes consists in regulating the contest between contracting parties and ensuring a relatively equalized landscape of bargaining capacity, bargaining power being interpreted as 12 See, for instance, for contract law, at the EU level, Article 4:109 (ex -art. 6.109) of the Principles of European Contract Law 2002 on excessive benefit or unfair advantage because at the time of the conclusion of the contract "was dependent on or had a relationship of trust with the other party, was in economic distress or had urgent needs, was improvident, ignorant, inexperienced or lacking in bargaining skill"; Principle 10 of the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) concerning restrictions to the principle of the freedom of contract because of inequality of bargaining power (even in the context of B2B relations) and the contract law sub-doctrines that explicitly or implicitly incorporate bargaining power such as unconscionability, duress, undue influence, the parol evidence rule and public policy. On unfair competition, again at the E.U.E.U. level, see Green Paper on unfair trading practices in the business-to-business food and non-food supply chain in Europe COM(2013) 37; Communication of the Commission, Tackling unfair trading practices in the business-to-business food supply chain, COM(2014) 472 final. 13 the interplay of the parties' actual power relationship in an exchange transaction.
14 On the contrary, competition law defines bargaining power more generally, in terms of the ability of an undertaking to introduce a deviation from the price or quantity obtained from the competitive situation in the market in which the transaction takes place. In this context, buying power denotes the ability of a buyer to achieve more favourable terms than those available to other buyers or what would otherwise be expected under normal competitive conditions. This approach emphasizes the gain resulting from the presence of bargaining power relative to a situation in which it is absent (not necessarily that of perfect competition), 15 focusing on market structure and concentration. 16 It is usually thought that superior (or unequal) bargaining power may constitute a competition law problem as long as it leads to negative welfare effects in terms of pricing, choice or innovation, these "competition law concerns" being carefully distinguished from "non-competition" law concerns. 17 Two views are usually advanced with regard to the interaction of provisions on superior bargaining power and competition law. First, considerable effort has been spent in order to mould the concept of superior bargaining power into the competition law and economics traditional framework by bringing adjustments to traditional competition law concepts such as relevant market and market power 18 or focusing competition law enforcement on "buying power." Second, new provisions on superior bargaining power or economic dependence, introduced in the competition law statutes by some jurisdictions, are typically examined from the perspective of efficiency and consumer 6 welfare and usually relegated to the outer boundaries of competition law provisions on abuse of a dominant position, for instance on the basis of an error cost analysis, 19 or the perception that fairness concerns have little role to play in modern competition law. 20 Provisions on superior bargaining power are examined from a public choice perspective as a by-product of the political pressure of organised interests of small and medium undertakings or farmers, leading to the adoption of mainly redistributive statutes that restrict competition and presumably economic efficiency. From this angle, the existence of a superior bargaining power of retailers in the procurement markets does not necessarily give rise to market power at the selling side, harming final consumers.
Price transmission from producer to consumer prices seems to have worked so far in favour of final consumers, as producer price increases during the period of the recent rise of commodity prices in 2008 have been partially absorbed by the food retail sector through a reduction of profit margins, at least in the old Member
States. 21 It remains to be seen if the most recent decrease of food prices will also be passed on to consumers or if we will face a situation of asymmetric price transmission from producer to consumer food prices. 22 Similarly, the recent Modern
Retail Study of the European Commission noted that the increase in the overall retail concentration has been counter-balanced to a certain extent by consolidation in the 19 See, for instance, F. Wagner von Papp, Unilateral conduct by non-dominant firms: a comparative reappraisal, ASCOLA Tokyo Conference (2015), (on file with the author, shortly available at the SSRN) conducting an "error cost analysis" and advancing the view that dominance, and consequently the definition of a relevant market, is a necessary condition for a superior bargaining power to be considered as a competition law problem and recognising the countervailing impact that subsidiary contract law enforcement would have on error costs. An error cost analysis conducted in abstracto may underestimate the transaction costs associated with the use of the specific legal process, which may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and in some cases may be less important in the context of competition law enforcement than other alternatives. Error cost analysis may also lead to the . Finally, critics of the concept of superior bargaining power usually explain that the complexity of the problems raised by unequal bargaining power between retailers and suppliers cannot be solved by competition law and a more integrated framework is needed, combining the enforcement of competition law, when there is conduct that enters its scope, but also unfair trading practices laws, provisions of contract law and more generally civil law (tort law, European sales law), which aim to deal with abusive use of unequal bargaining power, and finally, soft law and self-regulatory initiatives by the industry that have emerged in several Member States. 24 The argument is often made that competition law may be less effective in dealing with the problem than these other areas of law, without, however, that conclusion being based on a thorough comparative institutional analysis that also examines the institutional and social norms related constraints that may limit the remedial potential of other areas of law to deal with the problem.
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This paper aims to question this quick dismissal of superior bargaining power from the traditional competition law framework. First, from a normative perspective, the role the concept of superior bargaining power may play in competition law enforcement becomes particularly significant, should one abandon a narrow neoclassical price theory (NPT) efficiency or consumer welfare driven perspective for an approach that would seek to preserve the competitive process or even one that will be inspired by political economy considerations and a "holistic" competition law 8 model. 26 In our view, the global value chain approach, developed by political economists and economic sociologists, provides the appropriate theoretical framework in order to better understand the interaction between suppliers and retailers in the food sector and enable us, on this basis, to design competition law interventions (II.). Second, from a descriptive perspective, we note that legislators and competition authorities do not share the antitrust law pessimism usually displayed by authors inspired by the NPT paradigm towards the concept of superior bargaining power, and have increasingly engaged with it, in the context of traditional competition law enforcement with regard to retail consolidation through buying alliances or mergers (III.). Finally, we observe the framing of new tools of competition law intervention in order to deal with situations of superior bargaining power in specific settings related to the food value chain (IV.).
II. The Global Value Chain Perspective
The structure of the food value chain and the relationship between the firms operating in it has changed drastically the last two decades. 27 Agriculture and agrifood production has taken advantage of technological innovation becoming more industrialised 28 and globalised. 29 Modern information systems enable suppliers to receive directly signals over the preferences of consumers for higher quality products, the private sector responding by creating "value chains" with the aim to reduce, through the exercise of control, the uncertainty emerging out of their interaction with a number of economic actors present in different market segments (and for which they do not dispose sufficient information). The globalisation of the economy has also led to the development of a transnational mode of production, with Being at the one end of the value chain, retailers develop strategies with the aim to build store loyalty, thus enabling them to extract a more significant part of the total surplus value. Because of this direct interaction with consumers and the need to preserve store loyalty, retail networks have more incentives than suppliers to control potential risks at the various nodes of the supply chain (e.g. in order to guarantee product safety). 31 For this reason, "buyer-driven" chains develop private food standards, which operate on top of public regulations. As a result of these developments, the food value chain is increasingly structured around "global value chains" (GVCs), which permit the simultaneous and coordinated production and distribution of a very large array of products that each stage of the supply chain has to manage effectively, without this involving vertical integration by ownership.
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The GVC approach provides a theoretical framework enabling us to understand how the global division and integration of labour in the world economy has evolved over time and, more importantly, how the distribution of awards, from the total surplus value, is allocated between the various segments of the chain. 33 The starting point for the development of this framework was the growing importance of new His framework is broader than the framework often employed by TCE in order to explain the prevalence of certain forms of organization (hierarchy versus the market system), as the latter focuses only on the determinants of asset specificity and the frequency of the transactions as the driving forces for organizational choice.
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The GVC framework draws inspiration from the resource-based or competences- characterised by heterogeneous competence bases and operating under conditions of genuine uncertainty, their existence being justified by the development of productive competencies and learning for a specific cognitive community that forms the firm's core. Contrary to what TCE predicts, firms will not necessarily develop specific capabilities and learning in order to engage in certain value activities, because for instance of economies of scale and the frequency of transactions, as they may be unable to develop the capabilities which are necessary for them to participate in certain value chain activities; they will be thus obliged to appeal to external resources. 39 Contrary to the contract theory of the firm, pioneered by TCE, the competence-base view of the firm enquires into the sources of the competitive advantage and the path-dependent process of accumulation of such capabilities.
Although the GVC framework adopts the markets and hierarchy categories of TCE, it perceives them as part of a continuum, the network category, which it then analyses as three distinct types of governance regime. In a nutshell, the GVC framework advances the following five governance categories:
 Markets where the costs of switching to new partners is very low;
 Modular value chains where suppliers make products to a customer's specifications, without however making transaction-specific investments that will generate a situation of mutual dependence or just dependence;
 Relational value chains in which complex interactions between buyers and sellers often create mutual dependence and high levels of asset specificity;
 Captive value chains where relatively small suppliers face significant switching costs and are "captive" to large buyers, such networks being characterized by a high degree of monitoring and control by lead firms;
 Hierarchy which denotes situations of vertical integration with the exercise of managerial control. The operation of the key determinants of global value chain governance is described in the following table. Of particular interest for the purposes of examining superior bargaining power is the category of captive value chains where power is exercised by "lead firms," in most cases these being modern retailers and supermarkets who drive the agri-food chain, linking daily groceries' consumers with small farmers around the world. In this context, supplier's capabilities are relatively low, the complexity of product specifications being high and amenable to codification. In the face of complex products and specifications, the "lead" firms have important incentives and abilities to intervene and to control the chain, thus building up transactional dependence and locking in suppliers. The latter are confined to a narrow set of tasks (for instance, provide raw products or simple assembly) and are dependent on the "lead firm" for complementary value adding activities, such as branding, marketing, commercialisation, advertising. As a consequence of this configuration, "lead firms"
are able to reap the overwhelming part of the total surplus-value of the chain. In This classification of various forms of organization of the value chain highlights the importance of conducting a careful analysis of the power relations along the supply chain, the aim being to unveil value extraction bottlenecks affecting the distribution of the total surplus value. 42 This analysis cannot be undertaken by the traditional NPT framework which mainly focuses on horizontal competition and its effects on consumers or total welfare and assesses the competitive interactions between firms within a specific relevant market. In contrast, the GVC perspective has a purely distributive focus and may be particularly helpful if one aims to understand real business strategies and how the design of the value chain may determine who profits from the collective innovation and other surplus value generated, the intercountry distribution of the total surplus value, in the case of transnational networks, if one takes a political economy perspective, and more broadly the impact of value extraction bottlenecks on the competitive process, the latter concept being intrinsically related to an evolutionary perspective on economic change. GVC analysis may question the mechanistic view of the countervailing bargaining theory argument, claiming for instance that the consolidation and increasing concentration at the supplier level may curtail the rising power of retailers, by emphasizing the risk of the development of "bilateral oligopolies" of consolidated producers and retailers and subsequently of double marginalisation that may harm consumers and the competitive process. 43 We consider that such an approach is particularly helpful, and this not only in the context of global value chains affecting developing or emergent economies 44 , which is a topic that has attracted some attention, in view of the necessity to promote a political economy framework that will enable local firms to participate to global value chains and thus to capture value, or to "upgrade" existing capabilities and to create The attention of the competition law enforcers historically lingers on size and market share or concentration of the negotiating parties in order to define their power relations. 47 However, scholarly studies on contracts and negotiations take a game/bargaining theory approach arguing that, for the outcome of negotiation, even more important than market shares or the size of negotiating parties is the existence of "threat points" enabling one of the parties to seek a "best alternative to a negotiated agreement" (BATNA). 48 Indeed, the negotiating party holding a BATNA has the possibility to resort to a valid alternative to the negotiation in progress or to the contract concluded, preventing hold-up and threats to cease negotiation. In conceiving the bargaining model one may take a Nash cooperative bargaining solution as the axiomatic starting point, 49 or resort to a non-cooperative or sequential bargaining model which will attempt to factor in the costs of the delay to agreement, and extend this analysis from bilateral bargaining to n-person bargaining. 50 Although it is not clear if the results will be the same under each of these models, their common feature, in contrast to industrial organization theory, is that bargaining power is perceived as a concept that can be measured with reference to a specific bargaining relation in a specific context and it is not dependent on structural analysis (for instance the existence of monopsony or oligopsony). Bargaining power may also impact on price as well as on non-price terms. 51 Measuring bargaining power is a difficult exercise that scholars and law enforcers have tried to engage with, adopting diverse approaches. 
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Measuring superior bargaining power
For instance, in 2014, the Bundeskartellamt concluded an in-depth study in the food retail sector, where it attempted to measure superior bargaining power ("demand side power" -"Nachfragemacht") econometrically by exploring the conditions of its existence. 52 The conditions of bargaining power were converted into independent variables used for the econometric assessment. The selection of the independent variables was performed on the basis of a survey. In particular, the Bundeskartellamt looked into the procurement market of branded products for several reasons, including the fact that they form the core business of retailers, they are at the center of the majority of competition complaints and they are easier to compare and identify. 53 The authority initially divided the products object of negotiations into four categories: "product category," xxx"must-stock items," "items listed at a discounter"
and "high-turnover items." Furthermore, they identified seven procurement markets with different market structures. In order to identify and order the branded products 53 The other market identified by the Bundeskartellamt is the one of private labels, which the authority describes as characterized by a different "bargaining logic," although deeply influencing the negotiations for branded products. Private labels are usually bargained through tenders, while branded products are traded with annual negotiations. However, in its econometric study the Bundeskartellamt states that "private labels are actually considered in the assessment of the "competitive environment" of the branded products," see Bundeskartellamt, Summary of the Final Report of the Sector Inquiry into the Food Retail Sector, 8. In this connection the Bundeskartellamt observes that private labels are often considered as part of a different market with respect to branded products. However, they can be often used in negotiations to put pressure on manufacturers of branded products, at 11.  r's own brands ("Handelsmarken"): these must be substitutable for brands of p, and p must not be (by chance) the actual producer of r's own brands; 54 Hence, the Bundeskartellamt especially focusses on the walk-away point in the specific negotiation and how it is influenced by different factors for each party. 55 Bundeskartellamt Food Retail Report, 321. 56 Bundeskartellamt Food Retail Report, 322. 57 Bundeskartellamt Food Retail Report, 323. 58 Bundeskartellamt Food Retail Report, 324. However the Bundeskartellamt states that this is only true if two conditions are assumed. Firstly the other brand has to pose a sufficient substitution to the article which is the subject of the negotiations and secondly that the producer of the relevant article is not also the producer of the alternative trade brand. The Bundeskartellamt measures the value of this influence with the help of a survey in which the undertakings were asked to assess the importance of alternative brands. Furthermore the survey asked for an assessment of the substitutability of the specific article through the alternative on a scale from 0% to 100 %. In such cases, the producer is in a stronger bargaining position, since the retailer has no BATNA.
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In a 2012 sector inquiry, the Italian Competition Authority studied the bargaining power of retailers and suppliers on the basis of three different "clusters" of undertakings, reaching comparable results. 65 These "clusters" were obtained by comparing several data, including the overall turnover, the number of retailers supplied, the "strength" of the brand (especially in the specific geographic area). In 59 Bundeskartellamt Food Retail Report, 324-325. 60 Membership in a buyer group reduces the outside-options of the supplier and thereby may lead to better conditions for the demand side. The impact of the membership is measured by adding a variable which is 1 for "yes" and 0 for "no". In a second step it is measured whether an undertaking is a "big" or a "small" member of such a group. Thereby a variable only gets the value one, when the undertaking is not the one with the highest turnover in the group. 61 Bundeskartellamt, Summary of the Final Report of the Sector Inquiry into the Food Retail Sector, 10. 62 Bundeskartellamt, Summary of the Final Report of the Sector Inquiry into the Food Retail Sector, 10. 63 Bundeskartellamt, Summary of the Final Report of the Sector Inquiry into the Food Retail Sector, 10. 64 However, these so-called "must-have" products accounted only to 6% of the sample adopted by the authority that, according to the same authority, can be reasonably taken as representative of the whole food-retail national market.
19 particular, these three groups or "clusters" were: i) undertakings with high bargaining power; ii) undertakings with medium bargaining power and iii) undertakings with low bargaining power. 66 The data published by the ICA relatively differs from that of the 
Purchasing cooperation agreements and superior bargaining power
NCAs have increasingly looked into buying alliances and joint purchasing agreements concluded between major retail chains, these agreements becoming more common following the food crisis of 2008. Group purchasing organisations ("GPOs") may take different forms of governance structure depending on the level of integration they select, spanning from jointly controlled companies to looser forms of cooperation, collectively referred to as "joint purchasing arrangements"
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. 70 In this type of agreements, the smaller retailers generally issue mandate contracts to the "head" of the purchasing cooperation in order to negotiate the conditions of procurement for the whole organisation. These forms of cooperation generally include several other conditions in order to coordinate selling practices and share information, especially about procurement costs. 71 The findings of the national competition authorities corroborate the view that these purchasing cooperation agreements have, in many cases, an almost negligible effect on the bargaining power of the major retailers, while, in the short term, they improve the bargaining position of the smaller retailers. 72 This is true even when, as it is apparently the case, the head of the purchasing organisation does not pass on the benefit of the bargain in whole. 73 Yet these agreements may also lead to long-term forms of cooperation, including the sharing of sensitive information, and may create the conditions for the economic dependence of the smaller retailers that often structure their business model to the one dictated by the cooperation agreement. 74 In addition, the coordination of the selling practices may cause the "homogenization" of the assortments and of the services offered by the undertakings participating to the buying alliance, thus dampening competition. 75 In analysing these agreements the competition authorities had departed from a strict application of the concept of dominance and adopted a broad understanding of economic dependence, exposing it to hold-up from its business partner. In the second scenario, the economic dependence may result from market conditions preexisting to the stipulation of the contract, which forced one of the parties to accept the terms imposed by the other party and to undertake specific investments. With regard to its causes, the situation of economic dependence may derive from the absence of "outside options" for one of the business parties, or from high switching costs. 79 The food market presents plenty of opportunities for hold-up and anticompetitive conduct engendered by situations of economic dependence.
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Farmers generally undertake specialized capital investments to provide the products at the local and international standards, under contractual arrangement with buyers.
In particular, in markets of perishable products with few buyers, this contractual relationship easily turns into an economic dependence of the farmer to the buyer.
Moreover, the particular conditions of the market of perishable products may be the cause of hold-up due to lack of alternatives for logistic reasons. Indeed, some products, such as chicken or sugar beets, have to be marketed locally, as they cannot be shipped far without losing much of their value. Processors and local buyers can therefore use this opportunity to impose low prices on farmers or nonfavourable conditions.
Focusing on the relations between supplier and buyer, the Italian competition authority identifies four broad categories of economic dependence: i) dependence on assortment of the retailer, typically linked to branded products, which defines the lack of alternatives to a particular product or group of products; ii) dependence for shortage of supply sources, where the economic dependence originates from a situation of temporary lack of the specific product on the market; iii) dependence of the supplier, due to the fact that the supplier produces a significant share of its sales with a single buyer; iv) dependence on trade relations, in which the dependence originates from the significant asset-specific investments made by a contractor in order to fulfil its commitments and the difficulty to redeploy those investments for other purposes.
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The French authority, instead, considers four different criteria for determining a situation of economic dependence: i) the importance of the share of revenue generated by that supplier with the distributor; ii) the importance of the distributor in the marketing of the products concerned; iii) the absence of deliberate choice of supplier to concentrate its sales from the distributor; iv) the absence of alternative solutions supplier.
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However, both authorities conclude that this situation of economic dependence often gives rise to opportunistic hold-ups from the party enjoying superior bargaining position. In particular, these authorities observe that often retailers request contract modifications or additions to dependent suppliers, threatening to delist the supplier's product or to impose other forms of retaliation. 83 In its sector inquiry, the ICA observed that the 67% of the respondent suppliers reported requests of modifications or additions to the supply contracts during their executions. 84 In several cases, the request of the retailer to modify or add contract terms also regarded discount terms and expenditures, which were already been negotiated, having therefore a retroactive effect. 85 From the sample adopted, the authority stressed that the 74% of the respondents who refused to modify the contract accordingly to the retailer's request, reported having suffered retaliation, either by delisting (62% of In detail, the respondents replied that this coercive modification of the contract happens: for the 45% "sometimes," for the 18% "often", and for the 4% "always." 85 In this regard, the ICA points out that "[i]t is particularly interesting to note that the majority of respondents (74%) perceive, always or sometimes, these requests for unilateral modification of contract terms as binding for the supplier, which is exposed in the event of rejection, to specific retaliation, such as 'delisting' (that is, the exclusion from the list of suppliers), total or only for some products, or an unjustified worsening of the conditions for the following procurement period" (our translation). The ICA, therefore, acknowledges that 20% of respondents stated that they accept the requests "always," 37% "often," 38% said they accept them "sometimes," and only 5% said they accept them "never," at 163. 86 These procurement contracts were generally annual and subject to renegotiation every year.
the start of the supply period, 87 and the following contracts detailing the procurement agreement are almost always negotiated during the supply period, 88 leaving therefore ample margin for the integration of the contract by the dominant party.
These findings seem to support those studies claiming that the adoption of incomplete agreements (such as framework contracts), which parties detail during the execution, exposes the economic dependent undertaking to opportunistic holdups.
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In 2011, the Spanish National Commission for Competition (now "CNMC"), published a report on the relations between manufacturers and retailers in the food sector, with the aim to describe the status quo of the relations between retailers and suppliers and analyse the impact on competition of the alleged bargaining power of large distributors. 90 The CNC found that the contracts linking suppliers with retail chains were occasionally left incomplete as for the consideration required, thus producing uncertainty, inefficient transfer of risk on the suppliers and a reduction of intra-brand competition.
91 87 In their sample, the 35% of respondents always negotiate the framework agreement before the start of the supply period, the 19% declared that this happens "often," and the 45% admitted that this happens only "sometimes"; In the wake of the CNC's recommendations, the Spanish Parliament approved the Law 12/2013 on measures to improve the functioning of the food supply chain (LCA), with the threefold aim to detail the conditions and characteristics of contracts between retailers and suppliers, lay down a "black list" of prohibited "abusive" practices, and empower the newly created Food Industry Information and Control Agency (AICA) to fine undertakings that fail to comply with these requirements. The Spanish Competition authority is highly critical of this new system where its competence overlaps in some cases with that of the Ministry responsible in the specific sector and with the new competences of the AICA, alleging that this has created a futile duplication of norms and institutions.
The criterion of a "significant impediment of effective competition" in merger control also offers some flexibility in order to assess unilateral effects that may be provoked by superior bargaining power. In the Edeka case, concerning the proposed acquisition of Kaiser's Tengelmann by Edeka, the Bundeskartellamt observed that although the target company had low market shares at the national level, in some districts, it was the strongest and closest competitor of the two major groups, Edeka and Rewe. 92 For this reason, the acquisition of Kaiser by Edeka would have created a significant impediment to effective competition ("SIEC"), because it would have significantly lessened the competitive pressure on Edeka in those markets where also Kaiser was present. Although it only accounted for 2-5% of the procurement market, Kaiser was found to be the only real alternative to Edeka and Rewe.
The SIEC test does not require market dominance, thus allowing the authority to impede a merger also in cases of non-coordinated or unilateral effects resulting from the dissolution of an important competitor. These effects have to be evaluated for both the downstream and the upstream markets. With particular reference to the procurement sector, the U.K. Competition Commission considered that the further imbalance of the bargaining positions created by the merger may lower the "levels of investment in new products or manufacturing techniques" and produce "adverse effects on product innovation and diversity." 93 Moreover, in more than one occasion, the EU Commission has warned against the possible anticompetitive effects that superior buyer power may create in the downstream sector, due to the discounts that the new merged entity is able to obtain to the detriment of competitors. 94 European antitrust authorities have engaged with several other potentially anticompetitive effects following an abuse of superior bargaining power, such as "waterbed effects" or "spiraling effects," 95 . However, the study also found that "a large imbalance away from suppliers and towards modern retailers was generally found to be associated with more innovation, reflecting in particular the finding that greater supplier concentration was associated with less innovation," although it was also noted that the Member States in the sample did not include those with the highest level of national retailer concentration. The methodology of measuring the level of innovation followed in this study was also quite narrow as innovation essentially referred to the introduction of "new EAN products" (EAN being European Article Number).
IV. A Different Kind of Competition Law
The atomistic nature of agricultural markets and the consolidation of the processing and the retailing part of the food value chain have brought attention to the issue of bargaining power in agricultural markets. As the following table shows, the agricultural/production segment of the chain is populated by a significant number of economic actors, their size varying generally from smallholders to agroholdings. 110 According to the Commission, if the negotiation by a PO on behalf of its members concerns supply in more Member States, the production volumes in each Member State should not exceed 15% of the national production for beef and veal and arable crops and of 20% of the relevant market for olive oil. 111 Section 12A of the Competition Act No. 89/1998 disposes that the Tribunal must "determine whether a merger can or cannot be justified on substantial public interest grounds by assessing the factors set out in subsection (3)." This subsection (3) limits the public interest consideration to four conditions related to the effect that the merger will have on: -A particular industrial sector or industry; -Employment; -The ability of small businesses, or firms controlled or owned by historically disadvantaged persons, to become competitive; and -The ability of national industries to compete in international markets. Article 62.8, prohibits the stronger contracting party from imposing unfair conditions on the counterparty. On July 9, 2015, the ICA concluded the first procedure based on the application of Article 62.8, against the retailer Eurospin, for allegedly imposing upon its suppliers the half-yearly payment of two unjustifiably large sums which did not correspond to any service provided to them by the group. 116 The ICA concluded, however, that the business conduct put in place by Eurospin did not constitute an infringement of Article 62.8. The contested contractual terms were indeed fairly negotiated and not imposed. Moreover, the ICA observed that the relative costs were proportioned to the service offered by Eurospin.
